This paper examines whether and how communication can help groups solve coordination and free-rider problems when they compete with another group for a public-good prize. We find that when group members make an anonymous individual decision on whether or not to contribute to the group success, within-group cheap talk communication significantly reduces miscoordination and free-riding.
4
game is played by two groups of 6 subjects. They report that communication significantly increases the participation rates of both groups. A point worthy to note here is that they use within-subject design with the same subjects played 20 periods of the game in no communication treatment followed by 5 periods in communication treatment. Thus the reported communication effect is confounded with learning effect in their design. Rapoport and Bornstein (1989) analyze the effect of communication in an asymmetric group competition for public goods between a group of 3 and a group of 5. Their results show that communication increases the participation rate in the large group but not in the small group.
As a typical psychology study, their experiment is run as one shot game which prevents them from observing the impact of communication on group behavior in a more rich and dynamic (repeated game) environment. Moreover, they do not provide any predictions for game-theoretically rational individuals.
Last, the prize in their experiment is a -pure‖ public good. That is, the individual share of the prize does not decrease in the group size. In contrast to the -perfect non-rivalry‖ characteristic of the -pure‖ public good, the prize in our study constitutes an -impure‖ public good. That is, the individual share of the prize is smaller in the large group than in the small group. In a single group public goods game, Isaac and Walker (1988a) find that more members free ride as group size increases in the provision of an -impure‖ public good but not a -pure‖ public good. Thus our design presents a severer free-rider problem for the large group relative to the small group.
Another novelty of our study is the way we implement communication in the lab. The two studies mentioned above all let subjects communicate face to face for only once before they make any decisions in the communication treatment. 4 In contrast, subjects in the communication treatment of our experiment had the ability to send free-form non-binding messages to each other through a chat window for 90 seconds in the beginning of each period. They were informed that their messages would be recorded and they would be required to follow two simple rules: (1) to be civil to each other and not use profanity, and (2) not to identify themselves. After the chat period was over, subjects simultaneously made their decisions. Compared to face-to-face communication, chat room communication preserving anonymity and excluding facial expression and other non-verbal stimuli as the chat program assigns subjects an id number based on the order that they sent messages. Yet chat room communication still captures interesting social dynamics inherent in naturally-occurring communication and it has been found almost as efficient as face to face communication in voluntary contribution experiments (Bochet et al., 2006) .
Also, by enabling chat at the beginning of every period, we are able to observe how subjects respond to the history of the play or layout and adjust a plan across periods as they articulate them in the chat.
6 competing with each other. Communication therefore completely eliminates miscoordination and freeriding within groups and leads group members to act as one agent in making decisions. Content analysis of group communication reveals that the most effective strategy for the large group is to explicitly designate specific contributors following a rotation scheme and group members understand the essence of mixed strategy equilibrium as they emphasize to be unpredictable in the chats.
In summary, this paper contributes mainly to two research areas: it fills in the gap of the participation game literature by examining the effect of communication in asymmetric group competition; it also adds to the development of laboratory methodology for the study of rich communication which not only allow us to document how communication influences decision making, but also reveals the mechanisms that are involved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the structure of the game.
Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 elaborates on content analysis, and section 6 concludes.
Theory
The experiment is structured around P&R's voting model. There are two groups A and B with A n and B n members respectively; each member of group A and group B receives an endowment of size 0 e  and then he or she must decide independently and anonymously whether to keep the endowment or contribute it toward the group's benefits. The group with the most contributors wins the game and receives a prize R , while the losing group gets no prize. If the numbers of contributors are equal among the two groups, each group gets half of the prize. The contributions are non refundable. The public-good prize is then shared equally among the group members irrespective of whether or not each group member made a contribution. Thus if group G ( ,
) is the winning group, each member in the winning group is rewarded / GG r R n  . In addition to the share of the group's benefit, each member in either group earns the part of the endowment that is not contributed to the group. The ordinal relation between the payoff parameters for an individual player in the model satisfies an inequality: /2 GG r r e  , where e is the cost of contribution, G r is the utility of a win and /2 G r is the utility of a tie. Given the inequality, a payoff maximizing player should contribute when his or her contribution is critical to winning the game. The inequality can also be reduced to /2 G re  . A payoff maximizing player should contribute when his or her contribution is critical to tying the game. There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this game.
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P&R show that this game has two classes of mixed strategy Nash equilibria: 1) Mixed-pure strategy equilibria where all members of one group contribute with a positive probability and members of the other group are divided into subgroups of contributors and noncontributors. P&R consider these equilibria implausible.
5 This paper thus focuses on the second class of Nash equilibria.
2) Totally mixed strategy quasi-symmetric equilibria (hereafter, mixed strategy equilibria) where all members in the small group contribute with the same probability p and all members in the large group contribute with the same probability q . The mixed strategy equilibria are determined by equating the expected payoff from contributing to the expected payoff from not contributing so that no one can increase or decrease his or her payoff by changing the contribution decisions unilaterally. Specifically, for any player i in Group A to be willing to randomize, that is, he or she is indifferent to contribute or not, it must be the case that:
EV NContribute =0, which is a function of two unknowns , pq and can be simplified to 12 ( ) / 2 / A P P e r  where 1 P is the probability that the contribution of player i will change a losing situation into a tie and 2 P is probability that the contribution of player i will break a tie and lead to a win. Thus if 12 ( ) / 2 / A P P e r  , i.e., the probability of being critical exceeds the cost to benefit ratio, player i should choose to contribute. Similarly, we can get another function of , pq for players in Group B such that ()
EV NContribute =0With two functions and two unknowns, we can numerically solve the mixed strategy equilibria.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The asymmetric competition we implement in the laboratory is between a small group of three members and a large group of five members, i.e., 5 , 3   B A n n . With at least three members, coalitions can be formed and some kind of organization is present. Also, in one of the treatments, we ask groups to reach a unanimous decision. The odd-numbered group makes it easier since it admits the possibility of a decisive majority vote to reach a group decision. Without loss of generality, individual endowments are set to be unity ( 1  e ). That is, the un-refundable cost of contribution equals one.
Our experiment consists of 35 statistically independent sessions with a total of 184 subjects across four different treatments, as summarized in Table 1. 8 tokens in the IPG game. Each member is endowed with one token and decides whether to contribute the token to the group account or keep it to him or herself. The group with more tokens in the group account wins the prize, which is shared equally among the contributors and non-contributors. When there is a tie, the prize is split between the two groups. There is an incentive to free ride because only the contributors bear the cost of contribution. No form of communication is permitted. Treatment 3x5 C: This treatment adds to treatment 3x5NC, it allows group members the opportunity to communicate with one another in the beginning of each period. Group members have 90 seconds to send free-form messages to each other through a chat window before deciding whether to contribute the endowed token. Communication is non-binding-group members (who make their contribution decisions privately and anonymously) are not constrained to keep any agreement that they may have reached during the chat period. Treatment 1x1 G: This treatment differs from treatment 3x5 NC and 3x5 C in the way that tokens are endowed. Tokens are distributed collectively, to the entire group, instead of separately, to each individual. The large (small) group decides how many of the 5 (3) endowed tokens to contribute. The group with the higher contributions wins a prize. Group members share the prize and the retained endowment equally. There is no incentive to free ride because the cost of the contributions is born by every group member. Again, non-binding, within-group communication is allowed for 90 seconds before group members make the actual decisions simultaneously and anonymously in the beginning of each period. The unanimous decision selected by all members in the group is implemented as the group decision. Each group has up to 10 rounds to reach a unanimous decision. If a unanimous decision is not reached by the 10 th round, the choice of allocating -0‖ tokens to the group account is automatically implemented as the -group decision‖. Communication is only permitted for the first round at the beginning of each period. The effectiveness of communication in solving miscoordination and free-riding problems within groups is examined in the pair-wise comparisons of the first three treatments: 3x5 NC, 3x5 C and 1x1 G.
More specifically, treatment 1x1 G should be equivalent to the case where communication completely eliminates miscoordination and free-riding. The difference between treatment 3x5 NC and treatment 3x5 C allows us to measure the degree to which miscoordination and free-riding is reduced, while the difference between treatment 3x5 C and treatment 1x1 G conveys the extent to which miscoordination and free-riding still remain. The comparison between treatment 1x1 G and treatment 1x1 I indicates whether individual choices differ from group decisions in this paradigm. This contributes to the experimental literature on the investigation of the general differences between the decisions of individuals and groups.
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All subjects were recruited from a wide cross-section of undergraduates at Purdue University. A computerized interface using the software z-tree was adopted to implement the experimental environment (Fischbacher, 2007) . Instructions were read aloud while subjects followed along on their own copy. Subjects were given a quiz on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions before the games were played. For each correct answer, they earned 50 cents. More than 90% of the quiz questions were answered correctly in all sessions.
In treatment 3x5 NC, treatment 3x5 C and treatment 1x1 G, 16 subjects were randomly and anonymously placed into either a 3-person group or a 5-person group. Each 3-person group was then paired with one of the 5-person groups to form a single session of 8 subjects. Group compositions remained the same for the first 10 periods. Before the start of period 11, subjects were regrouped. 7 After the regrouping, another 10 periods were played. Subjects' own group decision, the decision of the opponent group, subjects' individual earnings for each period and the cumulative individual earnings were provided at the end of each period. Similarly, in treatment 1x1 I, 16 subjects were randomly split into 8 sessions and assigned to two roles: Person A (endowed with 3 tokens) or Person B (endowed with 5 tokens). The role of subjects were fixed for the first 10 periods and switched at the beginning of period 11 for another 10 periods. Decisions made by the two subjects as well as subjects' individual period and cumulative earnings were reported at the end of each period.
Subjects' earnings were designated in -experimental tokens‖. 
Predictions, Hypotheses and Results
We conducted all sessions with a prize of 18 tokens. This parameter choice generates relatively distinct types of equilibrium. We refer to one equilibrim as Type H to reflect the higher contribution rates from both groups relative to the other Type L equilibrium. Individual Contr. Rate P(large loses) P(large ties) P(large wins)
As Table 2 shows, in both equilibria, small group contributes at higher rate than large group.
Large group loses most of the time (80.7%) in Type L equilibria because large group rarely contributes.
In Type H equilibria, groups compete aggressively at an individual contribution rate of 0.91 in small group and 0.74 in large group. Despite the size advantage, large group is able to win just over half of the time (56.7%). Small group still has 9.5% chance to win.
The theoretical predictions highlight the fact that small group members contribute more often than large group members. Three hypotheses are formed based on the theoretical predictions. Results 1: Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Results 2: Hypothesis 2H is supported.
Results are reported in Table 2 . In treatment 3x5 NC, the individual contribution rate is higher in the small group than in the large group. Data are completely at odds with Type L equilibrium. Groups were competing aggressively. Averaging across six sessions, the large group only wins the game 56.7% of the time and ties the game 25.8% of the time.
To form a set of testable hypotheses for the communication treatment, we thus consider the extreme benchmark where within-group communication completely eliminates the free-riding incentives in the group competition. In this case, members of each group are able to reach an agreement to coordinate their individual choices and act as one agent and also believe that members of the other group behave in the similar fashion. This implies a restructuring of the group competition into a two-player nonzero-sum game (hereafter, 1x1 game; we refer to the group competition as 3x5 game corresponding to 1x1 game.):
A small player endowed with 3 tokens and a large player endowed with 5 tokens, decide how many tokens out of their endowments to contribute to a group account. Contributions are not refundable. The player with higher contributions wins a prize of 18 tokens and the player who loses gets no prize. When there is a tie, each player gets 9 tokens. Treatment 1x1 I and treatment 1x1 G are designed based on the 1x1 game. The key difference between these two treatments is whether the two players in the game are two individuals (1x1 I) or two groups of 3 members and 5 members each (1x1 G).
Given the payoff structure of the 1x1 game, it is straightforward to solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibria for the 1x1 game. Figure 2 compares the predicted probability mass function of group level contributions in the 3x5 game and in the 1x1 game.
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The white bars in the figures display the predictions in the 3x5 game while the black bars represent the predictions in the 1x1 game. In the 1x1 game, the small player should abstain from the competition about 78% of the time. This is quite different from the prediction in the 3x5 game where the most frequent choice for the small group is to contribute 3 tokens 75% of the time. On the other hand, the large player in the 1x1 game should contribute 4 tokens 78% of the time and either 1 token or 3 tokens the rest of the time. By contrast, in the 3x5 game, the distribution of contributions in the large group is much more dispersed. Note that the large group is expected to contribute 5 tokens about 22% of the time.
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Yet, only four tokens are needed for the large group to beat the small group. This highlights the fact that miscoordination within the large group causes inefficiency. Table 3 presents the predicted average group contributions, average group earnings and the probability the large group wins, ties and loses the game in the 3x5 game and the 1x1 game along with the data we observed in four treatments. Recall that the 1x1 game is structured as the extreme benchmark where within-group communication completely eliminates the free-riding and miscoordination problems. Based on the theoretical comparison between the 3x5 game and the 1x1 game, we form the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Within-group communication (treatment 3x5 C) helps to reduce free-riding and miscoordination. The small group abstains from contributing quite often and the large group is able to 10 All the data reported in this paper are pooled across all periods and all sessions for a given treatment.
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win the game most of the time. This leads to relatively higher earnings for the large group and lower earnings for the small group compared to the no communication case (treatment 3x5 NC).
Result 3: Hypothesis 3 is supported.
As shown in Table 3 , the probability the large group wins the game increases from 56.7% to 88.3% when within-group communication is allowed. Figure 3 reports the observed distributions of contributions in treatment 3x5 NC and treatment 3x5 C. When we permit communication, the most conservative Mann-Whitney test which takes each session as independent data indicates that: 1) Average group contributions decrease significantly in small groups (n=m=6; z = -2.330, p = 0.0198) and increase significantly in large groups (n=m=6; z = 2.887, p-value= 0.0039). 2) Average group earnings decrease significantly in small groups (n=m=6; z = -2.882, p-value= 0.0039) and increase significantly in large groups (n=m=6; z = 2.882, p-value= 0.0039). 3) There is a statistically significant decrease in the probability that small groups win the game (n=m=6; z = -2.908, p-value= 0.0036). Mann-Whitney test reports no significant difference in average group contributions, average group earnings and the probability small group wins in both types of groups. Recall that in treatment 1x1 G, the incentive to free-ride is removed by the structure of the game. Also, the observed distributions of contributions in both groups in treatment 1x1 G and treatment 3x5 C line up closely (Figure 4 The comparison between treatment 1x1 I and treatment 1x1 G allows us to examine whether groups behave differently from individuals.
Literature in social psychology and economics has provided compelling evidence that group behavior is different from individual behavior. 11 Concerning the performance of groups in inter-group 15 competitions, psychologists report that inter-group relations tend to be highly competitive as compared to individual relations under the same functional conditions (Tajfel, 1982; McCallum et al., 1985; Insko et al., 1987) . Evidence supporting this observation has also been reported by economists. Cox and Hayne (2006) find that groups bid more competitively than individuals when they have more information about the value of the auctioned item, which leads to more overbidding and less profit than individuals in a common value auction game.
Based on these findings, we form the last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Contribution decisions made by groups in treatment 1x1 G are different from those made by individuals in treatment 1x1 I since groups perceive the situation more competitively than individuals.
Result 5: Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
The Mann-Whitney tests on the average group contributions and average group earnings of both groups and the probability the small group wins indicate no significant difference across the two treatments. The comparison of the frequencies of contribution in the two treatments ( Figure 5 ) also supports this conclusion. lower offers in the role of responders in the ultimatum game (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998) ; groups exit the centipede game earlier (Bornstein, et al. 2004) ; groups exert less efforts as second movers in a gift-exchange game ; groups play more strategically in signaling game (Cooper and Kagel, 2005) ; groups perform better in terms of payoffs in beauty-contest game (Kocher and Sutter, 2005) . In the trust game, Cox (2002) observes that groups return less in the role of responders but reports no differences in the role of senders; By contrast, Kugler et al. (2007) find that returns of groups and individuals are not significantly different but groups send smaller amounts than individuals. Experimentalists also report inconsistent results in the dictator game. Cason and Mui (1997) find groups behave more altruistically than individuals whereas Luhan, Kocher and Sutter (2007) show that group decisions are more selfish and less altruistic than individual decisions.
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Observed 
Content Analysis
At this point we know that communication reduces free-riding behavior and leads group members to act as one agent in making decisions. This brings us to the heart of the matter: what kinds of messages are linked to this effect? We use content analysis to answer this question.
We used the following procedure to systematically quantify the recorded messages. First, we randomly selected a test sample from pilot sessions to develop a coding scheme which classifies messages into different categories. Second, we employed two undergraduate coders, trained separately, to independently read all messages and classify all messages according to the coding scheme. They were not informed about any hypotheses of the study. 12 We implemented binary coding-a message is coded as a 1 if it is deemed to contain the relevant category of content and 0 otherwise. Each message can be coded under as many or few categories as the coders deem appropriate. Category1 has six sub-categories.
Coders are free to code a message under as many or few sub-categories as they desire.
Cohen's Kappa K is used to measure coders' agreement which follows the conceptual formula:
Chance-corrected agreement = 17 zero. For reliability of quantitative measurements, 0.7 is generally acceptable (Neuendorf, 2005) . But for chance corrected measures of agreement, we should be more lenient in our definition of acceptability because correction for chance sometimes makes it nearly impossible to achieve agreement above 0.7 (Hayes, 2005) . We, therefore, take 0.6 K  as a satisfactory reliability standard. Table 4 displays the coding scheme along with the reliability indexes Cohen's Kappa K for the two treatments. For the vast majority of our main categories, 0.6 K  or is slightly below 0.6. Unsatisfactory agreement levels are found in a few of the main categories and some sub-categories resulting from infrequent coding. All discussions of codings hereafter are based on the average of the two independent codings, unless otherwise stated. Specifically, the value of the codings is treated as 1 if two coders agreed that a message belongs to a given category; 0 if the two coders agreed that a message does not belong to a given category; 0.5 if two coders disagreed with each other. Table 5 compares the frequency of codings for the two treatments. It also reports the ratios of coding frequencies between 13 In treatment 1x1 G, category 1 refers to "Propose how many tokens to contribute as a group" while in treatment 3x5 C, it refers to "Propose how many people contribute to the group account and/or keep to the individual account". Subcategory 1e and subcategory 1f only apply to treatment 3x5 C. Messages that appeal to play safe under category 10 are associated with contributing 0 tokens in the small group and contributing 4 tokens in the large group. By contrast, messages that appeal to take risks under category 11 mean to increase contributions in the small group and decrease contributions in the large group. Typical messages fell into this category 13 are: "you realize… we're comparable to Wal-Mart beating up on the small grocery stores‖; -that's gambling basically, this whole experiment is gambling; that's what these experiment people were looking.‖ An example of messages coded under category 14 is -Don't give them an inch. They fooled us once. Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on…fool me a third time oh shit-George Bush.‖ small groups and large groups across the two treatments as well as the ratio of coding frequencies between the two treatments. The most frequently coded category is category 1 in both treatments. It codes messages that coordinate individual choices by some specified decision rules, occurring for more than 35% of the time in both types of groups. The six sub-categories under category 1 help us to identify the different strategies groups adopt to coordinate their members' behavior. In treatment 1x1 G, the large group used majority rule to reach the unanimous decision as shown in the following messages: -group strategy proposal: if our decision is not agreed on the first round, we do NOT want to get caught with our pants down voting -0‖ because of disagreement…. so if somebody disagrees, go to the most voted number.‖ Thus, we observe more messages falling into category 1d (Agree with group members' proposals on the contribution level) and category 1f (Push for consensus on the contribution level) in treatment 1x1 G relative to treatment 3x5 C. On the other hand, in treatment 3x5 C, the large groups came up with the rotation strategy where the member with the same ID number as the period number was designated as the non-contributor in that period. The following messages were sent in a large group: -if one of us holds individual we will maximize what we can make cause they can't get more than 3, take turns according to rounds and don't be selfish; member 1 hold everyone else group, we will rotate to 2 next time and so on‖. This strategy was followed from period 1 to period 4. In period 5 some new ideas came into the large group: -hey…for this round only 1 person should put it into the group account…everyone else the other…coz they are always 0‖. The large group formed the strategy of contributing 1 token as a group instead of contributing 4 to optimize group earnings. And they actually rotated to be the noncontributor to equalize individual earnings. By contrast, the small group rarely rotated or explicitly designated contributors or non-contributors. The small group members' strategy was typically to contribute either everything (59% of the time) or nothing (31% of the time).
Another common strategy adopted by both types of groups is to fool the other group across periods. A typical quote from the large group in treatment 3x5 C is -We need to bet 4 for several rounds to make them confident we won't budge, and then while they are betting zero, we'll bet 1 for 1 round and get lots of earnings, and then go back to betting 4. So let's start off doing 4 for the first several rounds. We need to get them to establish a solid few sets of zeros.‖ A quote from the small group is -that's why if we are going to do it [everyone contributes] we have to be completely random.‖ These messages fall into category 2. This indicates that subjects understand the essence of mixed strategy equilibrium and try to implement their decisions in an unpredictable way across periods.
To decide the contribution level, groups spent a fair amount of time on reasoning from the other group's point of view in both treatments. For example, in treatment 1x1 G, after observing a previous -1 token‖ choice of the small group, one member in the large group said -ok they are going for a 0 now sure, let us go for 1‖ Another member responded: -Remember!: they are thinking the exact same thing we are, 4 is our only guarantee. They [small] think we think they're gonna put 0, so they'll try 3, let's just stick with 4.‖ Thus category 3 reveals the strategic sophistication of the subjects. It provides evidence for the Level-K thinking model (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a, b) .
Discussions about monetary benefits were coded under category 4 and 5. For the majority of the time, group members focused on their own group benefits. They specified payoffs associated with all potential strategies. For example, messages sent out by the members of the large group in treatment 1x1 G: -so if do 1 and win we get 4.4, if we 4 & win we get 3.8 & if we do 1 & lose we get .6‖; -if we choose 3 and win, we get an extra nickel, if we choose 3 and tie, we lose 80 cents.‖ This suggests that reinforcement learning model which assumes subjects know absolutely nothing about the forgone or historical payoffs from strategies they did not choose is a poor model by itself of group learning (Erev, I. and Roth, A., 1998) .
Moreover, the reference to the previous choices made by the other group suggests that subjects update beliefs about what other group would do based on history and use those beliefs to determine which strategies are the best. Typical quotes in the large group falling into this category are: -they never did 3 or 0 three times a row before.‖; -last time we did 1 they tried beating us for like 5 rounds after.‖ A
Belief-based learning model seems to better capture the data, given this direct evidence that players look 20 back at what other players have done previously and also give weights to forgone payoffs from unchosen strategies (Crawford, 1995) .
Groups referred to their own choices in the previous rounds much more often in treatment 1x1 G than in treatment 3x5 C. They either cheered for their success, -our group rocks‖ or regretted the choices, -Damn it, I told you guys 1 wouldn't work, stick with 4.‖ This reflects strong group identity in treatment 1x1 G due to the absence of the free-riding incentive.
Just because a category of message is used frequently doesn't necessarily mean it accomplishes much. Table 6 reports the results of the probit regressions on the contribution decisions made in the large group across treatments. The dependent variable is whether or not the large group contributed 4 tokens in a given period. Table 7 reports the results of the probit regressions on the contribution decisions made in the small group across treatments. 15 The dependent variable is whether or not the small group contributed 0 tokens in a given period (Model 1) and whether or not the small group contributed 3 tokens in a given period (Model 2). The independent variables are the numbers of messages coded under each category in a given period. Categories that are coded less than 2% of the time are not included in the regression. We also include three lagged dummies to control for any effects from observing last period outcome. They are whether large group contributed 4 tokens in the last period, whether small group contributed 3 tokens in the last period and whether small group contributed 0 tokens in the last period. Also, messages in category 1e -Propose to rotate or explicitly designate contributors and (or) non-contributors‖ and category 2 -Appeal to fool the other group across periods‖ may affect contribution decisions over a few periods as they are often referring to multi-period strategies.
We thus include up to 3-period lag of relevant variables in regressions. All models include dummies to capture the differences among sessions and a time trend variable (expressed as 1/period) as well.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the group level. Now let us discuss the marginal effects of the messages exchanged upon the large groups' contribution decisions of 4 tokens. In treatment 1x1 G, communication significantly improves coordination in two ways: through communication, group members are able to push for a consensus of contributing 4 tokens (category 1f); also, communication enables them to coordinate across periods and strategize unpredictable decisions. This in turn reduces free-riding behavior that is due to the uncertainty about other group members' intentions across periods (category 2). In treatment 3x5 coordination 15 The reason to use binary probit regressions instead of ordered probit regressions is that there are several strong modes in the contribution decisions-contributions of 4 tokens in the large group (78.6% of the time in treatment 1x1 G and 65.8% of the time in treatment 3x5 C); contributions of 0 tokens (68.6% of the time in treatment 1x1 G and 59.2% of the time in treatment 3x5 C) and contributions of 3 tokens (25% of the time in treatment 1x1 G and 30.8% of the time in treatment 3x5 C) in the small group . The parallel regression assumption is violated in the ordered probit model. through the rotation strategy (category 1e) is effective in reducing the free-riding and making groups act as one agent. Messages about being random to fool the other group across periods (category 2) significantly affect group decisions up to 3 periods. One typical quote from the large group can explain the positive effect in the current period and the negative effects in lag periods: -let us do 4 for 2 to 3 rounds and then drop to 1.‖ Table 7 reports the marginal effects of messages on the small groups' contributions of 0 tokens and 3 tokens. We observe similar effects of category 2 in small group decisions. Messages about making choices by reasoning from the other group's point of view (category 3) make the small group to contribute 0 tokens less often and 3 tokens more often. This is clear when we look at a typical message under this category: -they [large group] will get greedy and go down soon after a few 4.‖ Another interesting finding from lagged variables is that small groups understand that large groups are trying to be unpredictable. If the large group contributed 4 tokens in the last period, it is unlikely that they would reduce contribution to 1 in the consecutive period. Thus, to best respond to that, small groups keep contributing 0 in the current period.
Several other categories of messages have significant effects on groups' decisions across treatments. In large groups, playing safe means to contribute 4 tokens to ensure a win in large groups and taking risks means to contribute less. By contrast, in small groups, playing safe means to contribute 0 tokens to save the endowment and taking risks means to contribute more. Our regressions correctly capture these effects as can be seen from the coefficients on categories 10 and 11 in Tables 6 and 7 . Also, messages about the size asymmetry (category 8) increase large groups' contributions but decrease small groups' contribution. Lastly, discussions about benefits for own group (category 4) increases small groups' contributions. This is because these discussions emphasized the fact that the individual share of the prize in the small group is more than in the large group. analyze the content of communication to provide insights into behavior as subjects articulate their strategies in the chat. We find that the categories of messages that help groups to achieve the group outcome and avoid free-riding include messages proposing to rotate or explicitly designating contributors; messages appeal to fool the other group across periods and messages regarding making choices by reasoning from the other group's point of view.
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We focus on binary decisions on whether or not to contribute in this study. Yet, the propensity of lowering the level of contributions, but not necessary to contribute zero can only be observed when a continuous strategy space is allowed. We report the effects of communication in a more general form of intergroup competition in Zhang (2009) . Group members are asked to make a continuous contribution
This expression is the sum of three components. The first component is the expected payoff associated with a tie, i.e., by contributing, player i will change a losing situation into a tie and get /2 A r ;
the second is the expected payoff associated with winning the contest, i.e., by contributing, player i can break the tie and lead his or her group to a victory and get A r units of rewards; and the third is the expected payoff associated with a wasted contribution, i.e., excluding player i , the number of contributors in Group A has already exceeded the number of contributors in Group B. Player i 's decision of contributing or not will have no effect on the outcome of the contest.
The expected payoff of NOT contributing ()
EV NContribute for any player in Group A is: 
And the expected payoff of NOT contributing ()
EV NContribute for any player in Group A is:
Your tokens will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _4__ tokens to one dollar. At the end of today's experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
Please pay careful attention during these instructions. When the instructions are completed, you will take a short quiz on your computer to verify your understanding. The computer will record how many quiz questions you answer correctly, and you will be paid 2 tokens for every correct answer.
The experiment is composed of two parts and each part consists of 10 decision-making periods. The payoffs of all 20 periods determine your total earnings. Now we are reading the instructions for part one.
Instructions-Part One (Treatment 1x1 G)
There are 10 periods in part one. Before we start, the 16 participants in today's experiment will be randomly and anonymously placed into either a 3-person group or a 5-person group. You will know how many participants are in your group but you will have no way of knowing which of the participants are assigned to which group. Each 3-person group will then be paired with one of the 5-person groups to form a set of 8 participants. The compositions of your group and other groups will remain the same in this part of the experiment. The groups' compositions (or other aspects of the experiment) may or may not change in the second part of the experiment.
Your Decision:
If you are in the 3-person group, EACH period your group will be given an endowment of 3 tokens.
If you are in the 5-person group, EACH period your group will be given an endowment of 5 tokens.
You will be asked to decide how many tokens out of your endowment to be allocated to the group account. These endowed tokens can NOT be saved for later periods. An example of your decision screen is shown below.
Decision Screen
Before you are asked to make the allocation decision you will have an opportunity to communicate with the members of your own group in a chat window. You will have 90 seconds to chat with each other anonymously. Although we will record the messages that you send, only you and your group members will see them. Note, in sending messages back and forth between you and the other members we request that you follow two simple rules: (1) Be civil to each other and use no profanity and (2) Do not identify yourself.
A sample screen with the chat window is shown on the next page.
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Chat Window
You can open your chat window by clicking on the [messenger] tab in the task bar and you can switch back to the decision screen by simply clicking on the decision screen.
Please do not close any windows on the computer during the experiment. Accidentally close the window will cause a delay for about 10 minutes.
When the chat time is over, all group members then make their actual decisions simultaneously. After you make your decision, you will be informed about the actual allocation decisions of your group members. The unanimous decision selected by all people in your group will be implemented as your group decision as shown in the information screen 1 on the next page. A unanimous decision is 3 equal allocation decisions in the 3-person group, or 5 equal allocation decisions in the 5-person group.
In case a group does not have the same allocation decision, a decision screen followed by an information screen will ask all group members to anonymously make their allocation decisions again without the access to the chat window (please see information screen 2 and decision screen 2 on the next pages). In other words, communication is only allowed once at the beginning of each period.
Please type your messages in this box. You can use ctrl+enter to send out messages or simply click on the send button.
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Groups have up to 10 rounds to reach a unanimous decision. If no unanimous decision is reached in the 10 th round, the choice of allocating -0‖ tokens to the group account will be implemented as the -group decision‖.
Information Screen 1: A unanimous decision is reached.
Your Earnings:
You will share your group earnings equally with all other members in your group for each period.
Given the decisions that your group and the other group in your set make, your group earnings are calculated in the following way:
(a) If the total number of tokens in your group account exceeds the total number of tokens in the other group account, your group earns a prize of 18 tokens and the other group receives nothing, and vice versa. If the total numbers of tokens in the two group accounts are equal, both groups earn a prize of 9 tokens.
(b) Any endowed group tokens that are allocated to the group account are NOT refundable even if you get a prize of 0 tokens.
(c) Any endowed group tokens that are NOT allocated to the group account are directly added to your group earnings.
Here are two examples illustrating the calculations of your period earnings.
Example 1:
The unanimous decision reached by the 3-person group is to allocate all the endowed tokens to the group account while the 5-person group decides unanimously to allocate 1 token out of 5 in the group account (please see Table 1 below). The number of tokens in the 3-person group account exceeds the number of tokens in the 5-person group account, thus the 3-person group earns a prize of 18 tokens and the 5-person group gets nothing. The group period earnings are the sum of the prize earned from the allocation decision and any endowed tokens that are not allocated to the group account. Your individual earnings are the equal share of your group earnings. Both the 3-person group and the 5-person group make the unanimous decision of allocating 0 tokens to the group accounts (please see Table 2 below). The numbers of tokens in the two group 38 accounts are equal, thus both groups earn 9 tokens addition to their group endowments that are leftover.
Again, your earnings are the equal share of your group earnings. 
The End of the Period
After both groups in the same set have reached a group decision by the unanimity rule you will be automatically switched to the outcome screen, as shown below. This screen displays your group decision as well as the decision of the other group in your set. It also shows your individual earnings for this period and your individual earnings for the experiment so far.
Please record the results on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate headings. Then click on the OK button to move to the next period.
Before we start the experiment, please fill out the quiz on the computer. There are a total of 8 questions, each worth 2 tokens. Thus you can earn 16 tokens in total if you answer all the questions correctly. Please feel free to refer back to the instructions as you answer the quiz questions. Also feel free to raise your hand to summon an experimenter if you do not understand the explanation for a wrong 39 answer. Please do not say anything before the experimenter comes to you, as the experimenter will answer your question in private.
Instructions-Part Two
Part two consists of 10 decision-making periods. The rules for this part of the experiment are the same as part one EXCEPT that:
At the beginning of this part of the experiment, you may be re-assigned to a different group in your set. Your re-assignment is completely unrelated with your past decisions. Group composition will remain the same for all 10 periods after the reassignment.
Appendix IV:
